Mike Bird has the details.
Egon Spengler: There’s something very important I forgot to tell you.
Peter Venkman: What?
Spengler: Don’t cross the streams.
Spengler: It would be bad.
Venkman: I’m fuzzy on the whole good/bad thing. What do you mean, “bad”?
A speech from BOJ Deputy Governor Kikuo Iwata last night:
More recently in the United States, nominal rates went up, inflation expectations came down, and the expected real rates picked up after market participants started forming a view that the Fed would start tapering the pace of its asset purchases in light of Chairman Bernanke’s testimony on May 22, while in reality this was meant to slow the pace of increase in excess reserves. By contrast, the FOMC’s decision to continue with its quantitative easing on September 18 led to a decline in nominal rates, a rise in inflation expectations, and a decline in the expected real rates (Chart 23).
How beautifully ironic that the BOJ board is able to produce a critique of Bernanke’s tight money. Iwata continues:
What should we make of these episodes? In my view, they owe much to the fact that market participants make judgments on the monetary policy regime after they see changes in the monetary base and the excess reserves, and then form projections for the money stock, the future course of interest rates, and projections for prices.
What matters to interest rates and inflation expectations is the monetary policy regime of a central bank and market participants’ views on the prospects for the money stock based on such a regime. The current level of money stock is irrelevant. It is in this sense that the simple “quantity theory of money,” in which there is a one-to-one relationship between the current money stock and prices, does not hold in practice. Nonetheless, there is a close relationship between the projected future course of the money stock and inflation expectations, and the present rate of inflation is determined based on inflation expectations formed in that way.
A gem from the MPC’s June meeting minutes – yes, I’m a month behind still:
9. Japanese output had grown by 0.9% in the first quarter. It was probably too soon for that to have reflected the impact of recent announcements on fiscal and monetary policy. A durable improvement in nominal demand growth would depend in part on the third aspect of the Japanese policy package – structural reform – but there was as yet little detail on the form that that would take.
That’s a bit scary to read.
1) They believe so much in those “long and variable lags” that they are inclined to dismiss contrary evidence even when it is staring them in the face. And it sure is a good thing our policy-makers carefully studied the Great Depression and what happened to US industrial production in the months after FDR devalued, otherwise we’d really be in trouble. Oh, wait.
2) The path of Japanese nominal GDP depends “in part” on… supply-side policy? Erm, really? What can that mean? That the Bank of Japan does not determine the level of Yen-denominated values even in the long run? Is it a statement of policy – that the BoJ could raise NGDP but it would not be “durable” (“only inflationary”?) unless the government also does supply-side reform? Or is it an endorsement of “creditism”, the BoJ is “impotent” unless mumble mumble banks mumble financial system mumble mumble deleveraging mumble?
Any better ideas? Somebody send nine copies of Bernanke (1999) to Threadneedle St., pronto.
From the summary of “Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Management and Reform” from the Cabinet Office in Japan – what macro policy vision does Abe’s Cabinet have?
Macroeconomic vision that Japan should aim for in a new decade of revival
• Labor productivity growth by 2 percent or more in the medium- to long-term with a faster increase in wages than prices, accompanied by increased job opportunities
• Growth of gross domestic product (GDP) by around 3 percent in nominal terms and around 2 percent in real terms, with a higher growth rate to be set for the late 2010s
• Under the conditions specified above, it is expected that nominal gross national income (nominal GNI) per capita will grow by more than 3 percent in the medium- to long-term, resulting in an increase of 1.5 million yen or more in 10 years.
Every three months the Bank of Japan publishes their forecasts for inflation, including the range and the median of board members’ individual forecasts. Here is how the median forecast of CPI ex indirect taxes has changed over the last three meetings, looking at the forecast for Fiscal Year 2014:
|Forecast date||CPI ex
|October 2012||+ 0.8%|
|January 2013||+ 0.9%|
|April 2013||+ 1.4%|
And as of today’s meeting in April 2013, the median of the board members’ forecasts for CPI ex indirect taxes looking two years forward to fiscal year 2015 is… drumroll…
I’d call that targeting the forecast, so great job so far, Kuroda and Abe. Now hold that forecast steady and do not hesitate to print, print, and print some more, until even Richard Koo “believes the lies“.
The Bank of Japan had one vote (Ms. Sayuri Shirai) for open-ended QE this month – and there’s a nice teaser in the minutes:
A different member noted that one possibility would be to immediately put into effect the open-ended asset purchasing method, followed by an extension of the Bank’s projection period by one year, and continue with the virtually zero interest rate policy, as well as the asset purchases, until the median of the Policy Board members’ CPI forecasts exceeded 1.5 percent. However, these two members said that they were simply raising these issues at this meeting and would follow the majority view of the Policy Board.
Let’s hope Haruhiko Kuroda can move the “majority view” towards this oh-so-radical idea of “targeting the forecast”.