Archive for August, 2012

UK 2012 Q2 GDP in Pictures

August 29, 2012 Leave a comment

Some graphs updated for 2012 Q2. UK nominal GDP is now 15% below the circa 5% trend growth path followed in the decade to 2007:

UK Nominal GDP

UK Nominal GDP. Source: ONS Series YBHA.

The instability of nominal income growth since 2010 has not produced a significant downturn in the labour market, as it did in 2008/9.  I’ve used the LFS “claimant count” here, but the unemployment rate shows a similar picture of high but not rising unemployment.

Nominal GDP Deviation From Trend, and Employment

Nominal GDP Deviation From Trend, and Employment. Source: ONS Series YBHA, MGSX

Lastly here is the development of nominal gross domestic expenditure (consumption plus investment), the impact of net trade, nominal and real GDP, by quarter.  Quarterly growth at annualized rates, seasonally adjusted figures.

Qtr Nominal GDE Net Trade Impact Nominal GDP Real GDP
2011 Q1 1.0 +4.6 5.6 1.6
2011 Q2 4.0 -2.9 1.1 -0.4
2011 Q3 4.2 -1.1 3.0 2.4
2011 Q4 -1.1 +2.4 1.2 -1.2
2012 Q1 4.1 -2.3 1.8 -1.5
2012 Q2 4.8 -3.1 1.7 -1.6
Categories: UK GDP

Larry Elliott on HM Treasury and NGDP Targeting

August 28, 2012 7 comments

The Guardian’s economics editor, Larry Elliott, produced an interesting column over the weekend, “Why George Osborne believes everything is going to plan“, which ends with a discussion of nominal GDP targeting.

Assumption No5, therefore, is that the Bank of England will do the heavy lifting when it comes to stimulating the economy. Even though Threadneedle Street has already bought up a third of UK gilts (government bonds) through its quantitative easing programme, Osborne does not think monetary policy is now “pushing on a piece of string”. The mix of policy will continue to be fiscal conservatism and monetary activism, which raises the question of whether the Treasury will grant the Bank powers to buy up a wider range of assets, including corporate bonds.

Sir Mervyn King has always said that this is a political decision since it would involve deciding which companies should benefit from actions designed to drive down borrowing costs, but that if Osborne wants to sanction such a move the Bank would act as the Treasury’s agent.

Would the chancellor be prepared to take this step? Well, attention is being paid to the debate raging in the economics profession about the merits of replacing inflation targets with nominal GDP targets. This sounds esoteric but actually has big implications for the conduct of monetary policy, with its supporters saying it provides a way of recovering the output lost since the start of the crisis and its opponents warning that it will lead to inflation raging unchecked.

That choice of words in the last paragraph is very specific, “attention is being paid”, in the passive voice.  Surely, that can only be journalist-code for “I happen to know the Treasury is paying attention but they won’t put it on the record”?  We have already heard noise from the top of the Coalition (particularly recently) about needing loose monetary policy to offset tight fiscal policy, but there has been nothing public from the Treasury about NGDP targeting.  Even if this is only a trial balloon, it would be encouraging to know that the Treasury is at least thinking about it.

Elliott’s analysis seems plausible.  Osborne is supposed to be the “master tactician” of the Tory party, his every move calculated to secure a majority in 2015.  Right now that looks like a pipe dream.  A robust economic recovery without being seen to accept the necessity for a “Plan B” is the only way forward for Osborne, and NGDP targeting is the obvious answer.  (Lars Svensson’s Foolproof Way would work fine too, but that is perhaps politically even harder since it invokes the false image of “competitive devaluation”).

I am left wondering:

a) Can it really be true?

b) How could Osborne achieve a switch to an NGDP target without making it obvious “Plan A” has failed?

c) What could be the method of introducing the target?

For (a), maybe (and most probably) I am over-analysing with a large dollop of wishful thinking.  Why would the Treasury be dropping hints to Larry Elliot at the Guardian in particular?  Elliott is hardly Osborne’s strongest supporter.

For (b), an “event” from Europe could give an “excuse” for a major policy change.  But waiting for such an event would be unwise, since it might never happen.  Waiting for the new Bank Governor after Mervyn King’s term expires in 2013 may be too late.  So can Osborne switch course without appearing to switch course?  Any bright ideas?  Maybe he’ll just rely on voters having short memories and/or the “blame Gordon Brown” strategy.

For (c), as Left Outside has shown [edit: fixed link], the Treasury already has the legal flexibility to introduce an NGDP target by clarifying the definition of “price stability” which the Bank of England must follow.  If the Treasury intends to allow the Bank much wider flexibility over the range of assets it can buy, that could be done at the same time, or even used as motivation for the change.  “Buy whatever you like to keep NGDP rising at a 5% rate”.

Vince Cable, and now, possibly, HM Treasury.  Are we inching towards a UK NGDP target?  I’m cautiously optimistic.

Categories: Monetary Policy

More on Q2 GDP

August 28, 2012 1 comment

The largest contributors to the high deflator in the 2012 Q2 GDP figures are imports and government consumption.

Imports fell into a sharp deflation in Q2; import spending was flat but volume of imports rose at a 5.7% annualized rate.  That’s some deflation.  I find it hard not to connect the dots between the the Bank’s hawkish, disinflationary stance, the strengthening of Sterling, and the impact on the trade figures.  Even the most ardent Keynesian will surely agree that the Bank can neuter fiscal stimulus by allowing currency appreciation, removing export demand and increasing “import leakage”.

So even the most ardent Keynesian should be watching what the Bank is doing with Sterling.  In 2011 net trade was a positive contributor to real GDP growth, offsetting falling real domestic expenditure.  That position has now reversed, with real domestic expenditure growth (albeit weak growth) being offset by a collapse in the trade position.  Real domestic expenditure grew at 0.5% (quarter-on-quarter, not annualized) in Q2, against a fall in real GDP by 0.5%.

This graph shows the correlation between the deflator on import spending and the Bank’s “Broad Sterling” effective exchange rate.  I’ve inverted the Sterling exchange rate, so positive growth means Sterling devaluation.

Sterling vs the Import Deflator

Sterling vs the Import Deflator. 

Government consumption spending is an equally sorry tale, with nominal spending going up at a 4.2% rate (did somebody forget about the austerity?!), yet being fractionally lower on the chained volume measure.  As in Q1, the deflator is hurting.

Those numbers are so bad it’s almost tempting to believe the demand-deniers’ unfounded belief that the numbers must be wrong.  But absent revisions, the data are the best we’ve got.

UK 2012 Q2 GDP, Death by Deflator Edition

August 24, 2012 3 comments

It’s NGDP day, the month 2 estimates for 2012 Q2 are out.  Here’s the headline number: UK nominal GDP grew by 1.7% (annualized rate) in Q2 since Q1.

Nominal GDP at basic prices (which ignores indirect taxes), is slightly stronger again at 2.0%.

The deflator is really high again, like Q1.  Really, really, bad.  Obviously the nominal demand figures are awful too, and the main source of concern.  Quarter on quarter growth, seasonally adjusted annualized rates:

Qtr Nominal GDP Real GDP Deflator
2011 Q1 5.6 1.6 3.8
2011 Q2 1.1 -0.4 1.5
2011 Q3 3.0 2.4 0.4
2011 Q4 1.2 -1.2 3.0
2012 Q1 1.8 -1.5 3.0
2012 Q2 1.7 -1.6 3.4

If we look at Gross Value Added at basic prices, which attempts to avoid the distortion from the VAT rise in 2011, here are the numbers:

Qtr Nominal GVA Real GVA Implied Deflator
2011 Q1 3.4 2.2 1.2
2011 Q2 1.1 0.1 1.0
2011 Q3 1.8 2.5 -0.7
2011 Q4 1.3 -1.2 2.5
2012 Q1 2.3 -1.4 3.8
2012 Q2 2.0 -1.8 3.8

The deflator growth in 2012 Q2 seems to be bad in both the household consumption and government consumption sectors, I will try to do a post on the numbers over the weekend.

Categories: UK GDP

Good AD Policy Does Not Hurt the Poor

August 24, 2012 Leave a comment

It’s hard not to feel a little sorry for the Bank of England today.  First, a sustained attack from the rabid right-wingers, with Ros Altmann’s shrill attacks and the Daily Telegraph pandering to the liquidationists “virtuous” savers demanding higher interest rates and screw the consequences.

The Bank then publish a defence of the distributional effect of QE, only to suffer a broadside from the left, with the Indy splashing “Bank’s stimulus plan ‘has lined pockets of the rich‘”, and the Guardian run with “Britain’s richest 5% gained most from quantitative easing“.

Sometimes you just can’t win!

I think Chris Dillow has this about right – don’t blame the Bank for inequality, but I’d go a bit further.

If QE has effects in the real economy it must be through its effect on actual spending on goods and services, on the level of nominal demand.  If rising stock prices are not matched by an actual rise in corporate earnings, it would be a false wealth effect, not a real one.

Therefore, the mechanism by which you boost demand is surely irrelevant to the particular effects on assets.  If you think you can raise demand with fiscal policy, that must have roughly the same effect in boosting asset values, as faster spending growth means faster growth in corporate earnings.

In the end isn’t this all a distraction?  Bad AD policy hurts everybody, but surely has most severe outcomes for those at the vulnerable end of the labour market.  And if QE is a necessary part of better AD policy, it seems perverse not to embrace it merely because that policy also makes some rich people richer.

[Insert Here] Causes Aggregate Demand Crises

August 24, 2012 6 comments

I’ve got a new theory to try out.  Here it is:

If households accumulate too much wealth, an aggregate demand crisis must inevitably follow.  There is a simple causation: when households become very rich, they slow down their spending.  Because one household’s spending is another’s income, aggregate spending (income) will then subsequently fall.

My theory is perfectly consistent with the UK data, in which the 2008 recession directly followed an unprecedented rise in total household net wealth to £6.8tn in 2007 (Source: ONS Blue Book), a doubling of wealth in just ten years.  If you owned £6.8tn would you carry on working?  No, you’re not stupid.  And UK householders are not stupid either – you don’t get to own £6.8tn of wealth by being stupid.

The recession was not good for UK households, with their total wealth falling by a cool £1tn in 2008.  UK householders were not happy.  By 2009, they had resolved to step up and get back to spending more money so they could build up their wealth again.

By 2011, the recession was long gone, and UK households had built up their total wealth to a staggering £7tn.  Can you guess what happened next?  Yup, that’s right.  Boom.  Another recession.  The data are clear.  If aggregate UK household wealth rises to around £7tn, the people of the UK kick back and stop spending as much.

Yes, that is a pretty silly theory.  But this type of theory is what got me interested in macro.  If you replace “assets” with “debt” in my story… does it make more sense?  Or is it a confusion of correlation with causation?   And if debt in the UK (and US) caused an AD crisis, why is Australia different?  What if debt merely correlates with the level of nominal spending, and does not cause it?

This post is a roundabout way of saying that Nick Rowe’s post on who controls the size of the Sun is one of the most enlightening things I’ve read this year.  If you’ve not read it, I recommend it to you very highly indeed.

Categories: Economics, Monetary Policy

Kate Barker: Je Ne Regrette Rien

August 23, 2012 10 comments

Ex-MPC member Kate Barker has written a paper on UK macro policy for CentreForum, which I found to be thoroughly disappointing, though there is at least a discussion of NGDP targeting.

The only criticism she can find for UK monetary policy is that the MPC failed to tighten policy earlier, and prick the developing credit boom.

Policy content is arguably more important than institutions, however. As far as monetary policy is concerned, it is curious that no reform at all has been suggested. The failure of the MPC, of which I was then a member, to appreciate the financial problems building up in the economy and take any pre-emptive policy actions points to the conclusion that the two year horizon for bringing inflation back to target can distract the MPC from looking hard at longer-term underlying imbalances in the economy.

This is an utterly ludicrous analysis.  The MPC have persistently failed to set policy such as to hit the 2% target on a two year horizon since 2008.  Their failure to do so has been associated with one of the worst demand management disasters in UK history.  And Ms Barker’s policy recommendation is that they should concentrate less on the two year horizon and more on the “longer-term underlying imbalances”.  Maybe what we really need is someone running the Bank who has an obsession about “longer-term underlying imbalances” and cares little for actually setting good Svenssonian monetary policy.  OH WAIT.

The specific change to the Bank’s mandate which Ms Barker desires is as follows:

In addition to taking a longer-term view of risks to inflation, a more strategic approach to monetary policy would also be enabled if the point CPI inflation target were changed to a range, perhaps of 1-3%. In present circumstances, the MPC declaring its intention to aim towards the top of that range would reassure that there will not be a premature tightening of policy as the economy recovers.

This made me scream at my computer.  What was Ms Barker doing in all those MPC meetings?  She thinks they need more discretion?   Like in February 2009, when the Bank had set policy such that they expected to achieve a CPI rate of just 0.4% looking two years out?

Again we see this assumption that the Bank are “happy inflationists”, who really want to “aim towards the top of the range”.  If that were true, why have the Bank set policy which they’ve expected to produce  an inflation rate of just 1.5% on average since 2008, on the two year horizon?  The assumption is patently false.

That this document includes a commendable discussion of democratic accountability when delegating macro policy to technocratic bodies is a final insult.   The MPC have spoken, and they have declared: the MPC are blameless!