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Whip Inflation Now?!

November 14, 2014 1 comment

I see some fuss over the wage data (again)… but I’m not convinced, especially since this happened earlier in the year and it was a false “dawn”.  Declaring my bias: I want to believe there is still a massive hole in labour supply, either in the form of unemployed workers, or workers not getting enough hours.  Hence, we still have a significant output gap, and we can expect to see unemployment fall to somewhere near 5%.  Fast wage growth now would be a disconfirmation of labour market slack, so in a sense it is not what I “want” to see.  (I also prefer that we’d had a macro policy since 2008 which had aimed for 4% wage growth and avoided large shocks to unemployment.)

Martin Weale and others are citing survey measures of pay settlements.  I don’t see any reason to trust that over the ONS data.  But the ONS labour market update for 2014 Q3 gave us a spike in the 6m growth rate:

Private Sector Regular Weekly Earnings

Private Sector Regular Weekly Earnings. Source: ONS KAI7

That measure is clearly quite volatile.

The annoying thing here really is the “policy-based evidence-making” by Weale (inter alia), who has spent the last four years cherry-picking whatever data best supports his preferred policy of higher interest rates.  In 2011 Weale told us to look at the GVA deflator, in 2013 the excuse was unit labour costs, and in 2014 the excuse is that he spoke to some business owners who said wages were rising.  And by the way in 2014 the GVA deflator is running below 2% y/y and unit labour cost growth is around 0%.

Anyway, here are trends and levels for private sector regular weekly wages:

UK Nominal Average Weekly Earnings vs Trends

UK Nominal Average Weekly Earnings vs Trends. Source: ONS KAI7 , KAI7

That tiny spike is enough to warrant rate rises?  Really, that’s the best argument there is?  We also have the quarterly estimates of hourly earnings, with the update to the “EARN08″ table, although this survey measure excludes very high earners:

ONS Quarterly Hourly Earnings Estimate (Table EARN08)

ONS Quarterly Hourly Earnings Estimate (Table EARN08). Source: ONS EARN08 table

Again… there is no “inflation”.

Time to take the inflation target seriously

October 17, 2014 3 comments

It appears my timing could have been better in calling UK macro boring.

UK Market Inflation Expectations, FTSE 100, 2013-4

UK Market Inflation Expectations, FTSE 100, 2013-4. Source: Quandl, BoE

Those are not my ideal measures but the closest for which I have good data.  The 2.5 year implied RPI has fallen by 0.5% over the last thirty days, to 2.4% as of yesterday, implying a significant undershoot of the 2% CPI target over the Bank’s forecast period (2-3 years).  The FTSE 250 is at the lowest level for a year.

I caught a Newsnight discussion on the UK inflation data which was perfectly introduced by Duncan Weldon, who asked the right question: is the fall in inflation driven by the demand-side or supply-side?  The studio debate which followed was a little disjointed from the reality in which the UK CPI rate has been a consistently bad indicator of UK demand-side strength.  In fact it’s a contrary indicator, since periods of stronger real growth have been associated with weaker inflation and vice-versa.  George Magnus would have us believe that the inflation data is giving us textbook (“Economics 101″) evidence of a “chronic deficiency of aggregate demand”.  Chronic deficiency!?  If you ignore the fact that CPI inflation has averaged 2.9% over the last eight years, sure, Mr Magnus.

But I’d answer Duncan’s question like this.  If we see inflation running below the expected path and real GDP above the expected path, that looks like a positive supply-side shock.  If we see both falling short, that’s a negative demand-side shock.

Here for each quarter I take the Bank’s median forecast of the CPI rate and RGDP growth from the Inflation Report four quarters earlier, and compare with the outturn:

Deviation from Bank of England Year-Ago Median Forecast

Deviation from Bank of England Year-Ago Median Forecast. Source: BoE, ONS

The unexpected weakness of inflation and unexpected strength of real GDP growth does look like favourable supply-side news so far this year.  That’s a backward-looking analysis.

What matters now is policy today, which is forward-looking.  If the fall in UK inflation expectations is evidence of a positive supply-side shock then we should see a symmetric rise in UK real growth expectations.  So who has upgraded their forecast of UK growth over the last month?  The answer is… nobody has… and the fall in the equity markets (and gilt yields) makes it clear that growth prospects are falling too.

The Bank’s defence of inflation targeting as a policy regime, and their defence of the MPC’s decision-making under that policy regime, has always been consistent: what really matters is ensuring that inflation expectations are firmly anchored.

So… do it!  Carney and friends have been making hawkish noises in speech after speech through the summer, trying to prepare the ground for rate rises.  Does anybody seriously believe that there is even a single MPC member who believes the Bank is stuck in a “liquidity trap”, desperate for higher inflation but doesn’t know how to get there?  No: that is just a convenient fiction.

For the MPC, the facts have changed, and policy needs to aim at raising inflation expectations so they are consistent with the target.  Bravo to Andy Haldane for shifting in a dovish direction.  As for Martin Weale… what can you say.

Wages vs Employment

July 17, 2014 14 comments

There is an interesting asymmetry in how people read the macro data.

For a given increase in aggregate nominal spending (income) I think it would be generally agreed that “what we want to see” is a higher volume of output and not much inflation.  Does anybody disagree?  Anybody out there who would prefer the trade-off shifts towards higher inflation and lower output growth?  No?

OK.  For a given increase in aggregate nominal income (spending) we can consider the same trade-off between employment and wages.  I had taken it as given that we had a depressed labour market and so “what we want to see” is that increases in aggregate income will translate primarily into higher employment.

What we have seen over the last year looks quite amazing.  Over the year to the March-May 2014 period, hours worked has risen 3.7%.  We only have nominal data for Q1, but that showed a 4.1% rise in nominal aggregate labour income.  In other words, the increase in aggregate income has translated almost entirely into a higher volume of labour employed and there is no inflation - nominal wage growth is maybe just positive.

Yet this is seen somehow as a bad thing, see, for example the Guardian here, which puzzles me.  Do you have a sticky wage model of the labour market, in which AD shocks can raise/lower employment, or not?   Is higher employment in 2014 a good thing, or not?   These questions have simple answers for this simpleton blogger.

6.5% is a good news story, and let’s hope they keep coming.

Categories: Inflation, Wages

Administered Prices, Revisited

June 17, 2014 6 comments

A quick note, file under “Relentless Attack on Inflation”.  Thanks to some kind soul on twitter (whose name I’ve forgotten), I discovered that Eurostat have time series which split “administered prices” out of the HICP (= UK CPI).

UK HICP and Variants

UK HICP and Variants. Source: Eurostat HICP ex Admin Prices , HICP , HICP at Constant Taxes

I have discussed the effect of “administered prices” on the CPI here before, and I don’t have much to add.  When energy prices go up because of increasing regulatory costs is that an “administered price” shock which should be ignored, or not?  There are no “right” answers, it depends on your views on the appropriate goals for macro policy.

(It would be interesting to drill down into the divergence of the HICP from the HICP ex AP between 2004 and 2008.  Tuition fees again?)

Categories: Data, Inflation

Inflation, Inflation… There is No Inflation

June 17, 2014 15 comments

I want to clarify since I always feel a bit dirty after doing pessimistic posts about the supply-side:

1) I have very low confidence in any views about “potential output” and whether the productivity data is “correct”.  That is doubly true for my own half-baked views.

2) I think the productivity data should have a 0% weight in setting monetary policy.  Zero, zip, nada, zilch.  And I think nominal wages and/or incomes should have a 100% weight.

It is this second point which made me particularly angry at Carney’s (latest) hawkish move: the new data this year is telling us that nominal wage inflation is at record lows.  Hence we need tighter monetary policy because…?  Well, it’s not clear.

It is half true that the UK is looking more like Japan in 2014 than ever before.  The CPI rate is below target and now looking kind of “low“.  Nominal wage growth is dead.  Tax revenues are sluggish; there is a gigantic fiscal deficit and public sector debt is heading up to the moon.  The currency is looking pretty strong – something which plagued pre-Abe Japan regularly.  Almost everybody is a supply-side pessimist.  Our central bankers are hawkish.  And even Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition has been campaigning on the basis that “prices are too high”.  (Maybe Ed Balls read all the Japan ZLB literature sitting on his head?)

But that is not the whole picture.  I still don’t see any convincing sign that nominal GDP growth is slowing from around 4-5% y/y, a rate which should normally be consistent with the Bank’s mandate.  The “low CPI rate” today is as useless a demand-side indicator as the 5.2% CPI rate was in September of 2008 or 2011.  Inflation expectations are very stable and consistent with hitting that 2%.  Confidence indicators are at multi-decade highs.  I think “steady as she goes” would be a pretty reasonable monetary policy if you do want to take the inflation target seriously.

Anyway… 1.5%!!!

There’s No Such Thing as… Car Prices

May 29, 2014 7 comments

A nice reminder that price index data is a work of fiction statistical genius on which it is perfectly safe to base macroeconomic policy.  Reading through the ONS announcements today, this is how they describe the new methodology for determining car prices used in the national accounts:

4.2.2 New approach to be implemented in September 2014

For the new approach the list prices from Glass’s Guide are reduced to take into account discounts negotiated at the point of sale. The percentage discount applied for each model is partly offset by an uplift to account for point of sale accessories/optional extras purchased.

Discussions with industry experts including Glass’s and HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) established that data on discount prices and amount spent on optional extras isn’t available. As an alternative method, “target price” information from What Car magazine (monthly publication) has been used to estimate a best achievable discount. The target price is a guide to a typical achievable discount based on a team of What Car mystery shoppers (people posing as customers) who haggle with dealers. A discount percentage for each model is calculated using the target price data. Since this represents the best discount available, the discount calculated has been reduced by 30% to take into account not all customers will achieve this price (i.e. not everyone will negotiate the optimum discount).

“We took the figures for discounts out of a magazine and knocked 30% off for good measure.”  Why 30%?  Don’t ask too many questions.

The discount applied is further reduced to account for point of sale accessories/optional extras purchased. Research suggested metallic paint is the most popular extra added. This option isn’t typically available by moving to an improved model in the range which other optional extras often are. Looking across a range of models the cost of metallic paint typically offset the original What Car discount price by approximately 35%. ONS have therefore further reduced the discount calculated by a further 35%. The What Car best achievable discount price has therefore been reduced by 65% overall.

“Then we knocked off another 35%”.  Let’s hope there are no spreadsheet errors.

In fact it’s even worse: this method is used to calculate the deflator used for car sales, which is applied to the survey data on the volume of car sales to produce current price (nominal) spending.  The ONS really does produce RGDP first and NGDP second for some (many?) sectors.  The more I learn about price index and national accounts methodology, the more attractive nominal wage targeting becomes!

Categories: Inflation

House Prices, Monetary Policy, and Kafka

May 2, 2014 6 comments

We are going to have to watch these guys.  This is MPC member Jon Cunliffe:

The self-reinforcing link between property prices, the financial system and the broader economy that operate within the stress test have been key to dynamics in previous UK downturns. As well as lowering homeowners’ wealth, falls in house prices reduce their collateral and so their access to credit. This tends to drag on consumption. Preliminary Bank analysis suggests the most highly mortgaged households have tended to cut their consumption very materially in times of economic stress.  And investment in the construction of homes and other property has had a tendency to fall sharply in downturns, with this component of spending accounting for around half of the peak to trough variation in GDP growth across the 2008-9 recession. This combination of lower property prices and a fall in spending across the economy, can, through a rise in defaults, damage banks and contribute to a tightening in credit conditions, creating a further drag on economic activity.

It is Kafkaesque, this world of monetary policy.  On Tuesday the Bank of England describes clearly how the Bank of England can, by running a tight monetary policy, cause a recession and falls in nominal asset prices.  On Thursday the Bank of England is worried about how the economy might unavoidably fall into a recession when there is an unexpected fall in nominal asset prices.

I was half-joking when I suggested that we drop the CPI target in favour of a house price target.  But I am half-serious.  If the MPC thinks that stability of house price inflation is a necessary condition for stability of the real economy then they should clearly lay out the model in which that is true.  Then HM Treasury should consider whether the MPC should target the CPIH, or whatever, so that there is an appropriate focus on stabilising nominal house price growth.  Haldane is apparently going to push for a CPIH target.

Here is a really funny thing.  If the UK had applied a 2% CPIH target for the last five years we would have needed an easier monetary policy, because the CPIH rate has been around 0.2-0.3% below the CPI rate.  And an easier monetary policy would mean higher nominal asset prices.  Thus, if the MPC had been targeting house prices, it’s easy to end up with the conclusion that house price inflation has been too low.

(Because the CPI and CPIH and not equivalent this is really an arbitrary counter-factual; maybe a 1.5% CPIH target should replace the 2% CPI target… or maybe we should stop targeting “inflation” altogether.)

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